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BANNING HANDGUNS: QUILICI v. VILLAGE OF
MORTON GROVE AND THE SECOND
AMENDMENT
On June 8, 1981, the Village of Morton Grove, Illinois' enacted Or-
dinance No. 8 1-11,2 entitled "An Ordinance Regulating the Possession
of Firearms and Other Dangerous Weapons."3 To some, this ordi-
nance was the most draconian firearms legislation in the nation's his-
tory. To others, it was a courageous first step in a bold social
experiment.4 Morton Grove became the nation's first community to
ban, with certain exceptions, the possession of handguns within its
borders.5
1. Morton Grove is a suburb of Chicago, 25 miles northwest of the city, with a population of
approximately 27,000.
2. Morton Grove, Ill, Ordinance 81-11 (June 8, 1981). The Morton Grove Village Board of
Trustees consists of six members. The vote in favor of Ordinance No. 81-11 was four to two.
Morton Grove's crime rate is relatively low. In 1980, there were 189 burglaries. The most
recent homicides occurred in 1979 when two teen-age girls were murdered with a handgun in a
village forest preserve. Ordinance No. 81-11 was the response to a business license application to
open a gun shop. There are presently no gun shops in Morton Grove. In Morton Grove, Illinois,
Thev're Up in,4rnis Over Handgun Ban, Wall St. J., Jan. 20, 1982, at 1, col. 4 [hereinafter cited as
Handgun Ban]. While not specifically banning the sale of handguns, the ordinance clearly
criminalizes possession of such a weapon by members of the general public. See infra note 5 and
Appendix.
3. The complete text of Morton Grove, Ill., Ordinance No. 81-11 (June 8, 1981) is included
in the Appendix.
4. See infra note 13. The legislation enacted by Morton Grove, like the subject matter of
this Note, falls under the rubric of gun control. This term has become so nebulous and amor-
phous, however, that it is nearly meaningless. See RESTRICTING HANDGUNS-THE LIBERAL
SKEPTICS SPEAK OUT 2-3 (D. Kates ed. 1979). Gun control refers to laws which provide only for
weapon registration, as well as to laws which prohibit the possession of firearms by persons con-
sidered dangerous, such as convicted felons. Id at 3. Proposals by organizations such as the
United States Conference of Mayors and the National Coalition to Ban Handguns that advocate a
federal ban on the possession of handguns except for the military, police, and civilians with special
authorization, are an anathema to most handgun owners. Id See also N. LOVING, ORGANIZING
FOR HANDGUN CONTROL (1977); M. YEAGER, 2 How WELL DoEs THE HANDGUN PROTECT You
AND YOUR FAMILY? (1976). See generally LIBRARY OF CONGRESS, GUN CONTROL LAWS IN FOR-
EIGN COUNTRIES (1976).
5. See Appendix. Ordinance No. 81-11 provides, in part, that "[n]o person shall possess, in
the Village of Morton Grove... [a]ny handgun, unless the same has been rendered permanently
inoperative." Morton Grove, Ill., Ordinance 81-11, § 2(B)(3) (June 8, 1981). The ordinance pro-
vides exceptions: peace officers, prison officials, members of the armed forces and national guard,
and security guards are specifically exempted so long as such possession is in the performance of
their official duties. Licensed gun collectors are also exempted. Id § 2(E)(l)-(6). The ordinance
also does not apply to antique firearms. In addition, it allows residents to keep their operative
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Ordinance No. 81-11 was enacted with the view that outlawing
handguns within the Village would best serve the public health, safety
and welfare.6 The trustees of Morton Grove legislatively determined
that prohibiting handgun ownership would reduce the number of
handgun-related accidents. In addition, they regarded the ban as a first
step toward reducing the number of handgun-related crimes such as
homicide, aggravated assault, and armed robbery.7 Whether this ordi-
nance will achieve these ends is a debatable question,8 separate from
handguns in licensed gun clubs. Id § 2(E)(7)-(10). Violation of§ 2(B)(3), relating to handguns, is
punishable by fines of up to $500 and imprisonment for up to six months for repeat offenders. Id
§ 2(F)(2). See Quilici v. Village of Morton Grove, 532 F. Supp. 1169, 1171 (N.D. 111. 1981). The
ordinance does not prohibit the possession of long guns, i.e., rifles and shotguns, provided the
former are not automatic and the latter have barrel lengths of 18 inches or more. Morton Grove,
Ill., Ordinance 81-11, § 2(B)(2) (June 8, 1981). As such, this ordinance is not a ban on the posses-
sion of all firearms; a total prohibition would be unconstitutional under article I, section 22 of the
Illinois Constitution, See infra note 106 and accompanying text.
6. See Morton Grove, Ill., Ordinance 81-11, preamble (June 8, 1981). See also Quilici v.
Village of Morton Grove, 532 F. Supp. 1169, 1179, 1182, 1184 (N.D. 111. 1981).
7. Quillci v. Village of Morton Grove, 532 F. Supp. 1169, 1179, 1182, 1184 (N.D. 111. 1981).
8. In reference to the Village's interest in preventing handgun related accidents, the district
court in Quilici v. Village of Morton Grove stated that "[a] ban on possession of handguns in the
home cannot be considered an unreasonable response to that problem, and may in fact be the only
method of attaining [that] goal .... " 532 F. Supp. at 1179. See infra note 116. The question of
whether such a ban, however, or any firearms regulations for that matter, actually results in a
decrease in crimes involving firearms, is much more troublesome. Answers are elusive, statistics
often conflict, and the controversy continues.
In 1980, 50% of all murders were committed with handguns. Of all law enforcement officers
killed that year, 66.3% were felled by bullets from handguns. U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE,
F.B.I. UNIFORM CRIME REPORTS, CRIME IN THE UNITED STATES 1980 13,339 (1981). Someone is
murdered in this country an average of every 23 minutes. Id at 6. Clearly, the fact that we live in
a violent society has given rise to the perceived need for the protection, whether real or psycholog-
ical, that a handgun affords. In 1978, 43% of gun owners polled gave protection as their reason for
owning a handgun or pistol. U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, SOURCEBOOK OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE
STATISTICS 1980, at 204 (1981). One poll indicated that in 1979, on the average, nearly one of
every two homes (45%) had at least one kind of gun. The incidence of gun ownership was 53% in
the South and 70% in small communities and rural areas. This statistic is not surprising consider-
ing a 1979 Gallup survey which found that nearly one household in every five polled had been
affected by crime within the previous 12 months, resulting in either theft of property or the physi-
cal assault of a member of the household. The Gallup Opinion Index 20, in THE ISSUE OF GUN
CONTROL 61, 63 (T. Draper ed. 1981).
The question remains, however, whether firearms in the home really protect the residents. A
comprehensive study of accidental firearm fatalities in Cuyahoga County, Ohio (which includes
Cleveland) conducted by the School of Medicine at Case Western Reserve University indicated
that only 23 burglars, robbers, or intruders were killed between 1958-1973 by persons defending
their homes with firearms. During the same period, six times as many accidental fatalities were
caused by firearms kept in the home. Rushforth, Ford & Adleson, Accidental Firearm Fatalities in
a Metropolitan County, 504 AM. J. EPIDEMIOLOGY 100 (1975), quotedin M. YEAOER, supra note 4,
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the legal issue of whether it will withstand constitutional scrutiny.
The second amendment to the United States Constitution provides:
at 4. Yeager contends that firearms ultimately prove to be an ineffective means of self protection
because they are more likely to kill or injure the user or a member of his family than to be used
successfully against a burglar or robber. He concludes that "[tihe probability of being robbed,
raped, or assaulted is low enough to seriously call into question the need for Americans to keep
loaded guns on their persons or about their homes." Id at 1. Yeager is a member of the Handgun
Control Staff of the U.S. Conference of Mayors which advocates a national ban on the possession,
importation, sale, and manufacture of handguns except in certain instances. Id at preface.
Legislation banning the possession of handguns obviously entails confiscation of such weapons.
One argument against such drastic legislation as that enacted by Morton Grove is that many
otherwise law-abiding citizens who possess handguns, and fervently believe they have both a con-
stitutional right and an urgent need to do so, will defy such a ban. If this kind of legislation is
enacted on a federal level, those most affected will likely be minorities and underprivileged people
living in high crime areas of the nation who feel that possession of a firearm is absolutely neces-
sary to protect themselves. Kates, Toward a History of Handgun Prohibition in the United States,
in RESTRICTING HANDGUNs-THE LIBERAL SKEPTICS SPEAK OUT 5 (D. Kates ed. 1979). In
Kates, Against Civil Disarmament; On the Futility of Prohibiting Guns, HARPER'S, Sept., 1978 at 28,
quotedin THE ISSUE OF GUN CONTROL 185 (T. Draper ed. 1981), Professor Kates stated:
Liberals advocate severely punishing those who will defy confiscation only because the
liberal image of a gun owner is a criminal or right-wing fanatic rather than a poor black
woman in Chicago defending herself against a rapist or a murderer. . . . If only liberals
knew it, handgun ownership is disproportionately high among the underprivileged for
whom liberals traditionally have had most sympathy. . . . The average liberal has no
understanding of why people have guns because he has no idea what it is like to live in a
ghetto where police have given up on crime control.
Id See L. KENNETT & J. ANDERSON, THE GUN IN AMERICA 253-54 (1975), in which the authors
state, "[the ultimate fear [of gunowners] is not that government will tyrannize, but that it will fail
to protect ... [T]he gun remains the hedge instinctively sought against that fear." Id
Aside from the problem of enforcement (Ordinance No. 81-11 provides no means of enforce-
ment, but relies primarily on voluntary relinquishment of weapons, see § 2(F), (G) in Appendix);
the question remains whether a ban on handgun possession such as Morton Grove's will actually
have a marked effect on the number of handgun crimes committed. For a discussion of the propo-
sition that England's tough firearms laws, which make it virtually impossible for the average citi-
zen to legally obtain a firearm, are not responsible for that country's low crime rates, see C.
GREENWOOD, FIREARMS CONTROLS-A STUDY OF ARMED CRIME AND FIREARMS CONTROL IN
ENGLAND AND WALES (1972); Greenwood & Magaddino, Crime, Suicide, and Accidents: Some
Cross-national and Cross-cultural Comparisons, in RESTRICTING HANDGUNS-THE LIBERAL
SKEPTICS SPEAK Our 31-68 (D. Kates ed. 1979). "Fifty years of very strict controls on pistols
have left a vast pool of illegal weapons." C. GREENWOOD, supra, at 242. Rather, it is the social
milieu that determines the incidence of violent crimes. For an impassioned defense of the need to
protect one's self with firearms in an increasingly violent society, see Elliot, Letter From an Angry
Reader, ESQUIRE, Sept., 1981, at 33. See generally LIBRARY OF CONGRESS, GUN CONTROL LAWS
IN FOREIGN COUNTRIES (1976); Emery, The Constitutional Right to Keep and Bear Arms, 28
HARV. L. REV. 473 (1915); Zimring, Is Gun Control Likely to Reduce Violent Killings, 35 U. CHI.
L. REV. 721 (1968); Note, Constitutional Limitations on Firearms Regulation, 1969 DUKE L.J. 773.
In any event, determinations of the difficult questions posed above are the responsibility of
legislatures. The job of the courts is to determine only whether the legislative responses are rea-
sonable. 532 F. Supp. at 1178.
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"A well regulated Militia, being necessary to the security of a free
State, the right of the people to keep and bear Arms, shall not be in-
fringed."9 This Note deals primarily with the question of whether
Morton Grove's ordinance violates that amendment.'° The vehicle for
analysis is Quilici v. Village of Aorton Grove," the first judicial pro-
nouncement on the validity of the Morton Grove ordinance."2 In an
atmosphere of emotional public debate and controversy, the United
States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois upheld the
validity of the Morton Grove ordinance.' 3 The court held that the or-
dinance was properly enacted pursuant to the police power of the Vil-
lage, and infringes neither upon rights granted under the Illinois
Constitution nor upon rights guaranteed by the United States
Constitution.14
The average citizen has only a vague conception of what rights are
guaranteed under the Constitution, aside from the more difficult ques-
tion of the scope of protection offered by those rights. The public has
9. U.S. CONST. amend. II.
10. Whether the Morton Grove ordinance also violates the Illinois Constitution is discussed
infra notes 102-20 and accompanying text. The focus of this Note, however, will be on the federal
constitutional questions.
11. 532 F. Supp. 1169 (N.D. Ill. 1981). This case was a civil action challenging the constitu-
tionality of Morton Grove, Ill., Ordinance 81-11 (June 8, 1981). The action consolidated three
suits filed by four Morton Grove residents shortly after the enactment of the ordinance. Each of
the plaintiffs professed to be the owner of a handgun and thus subject to the prohibitions of the
ordinance. 532 F. Supp. at 1171 n.l.
The effect of Ordinance No. 81-11 has reached far beyond Morton Grove. Because of the im-
portance of the issues involved, the National Rifle Association and the Second Amendment Foun-
dation, two organizations advocating minimal regulation of private possession of firearms,
financed the plaintiffs' efforts in the district court and also will provide funds for appeal to the
Seventh Circuit. Morton Grove's legal fees were paid by the National Coalition to Ban Hand-
guns, a Washington-based lobbying organization. Handgun Ban, supra note 2, at I, col. 4. Since
its victory in the United States District Court, Morton Grove has been inundated with requests for
copies of Ordinance No. 81-I1 as municipalities across the country plan similar legislation. Mor-
ton Grove Ordinance Inspires Gun-ControlDrive, St. Louis Globe-Democrat, March 2, 1982, at 1,
col. 4.
12. U.S. District Judge Bernard Decker, who delivered the Morton Grove opinion on Decem-
ber 29, 1981, noted that he had not seen so much public interest in a case since his decision in
Collin v. Smith, 447 F. Supp. 676, aF'd, 578 F.2d 1197, cert. denied, 439 U.S. 916 (1978), in which
he ruled that a small band of Nazis could not constitutionally be prevented from staging a rally in
predominantly Jewish Skokie, Illinois, just east of Morton Grove. U.S. Judge Upholds Ordinance
Banning Sale, Possession of Handguns, NAT'L L.J., Jan. 11, 1982, at 3, col. 1.
13. For an illuminating presentation of public opinion in the wake of the Quilici Y. Village of
Morton Grove decision, see the articles and editorials in the Morton Grove Champion, Jan. 7, 14,
21, 1982, and in Handgun Ban, supra note 2, at 1, col. 4.
14. 532 F. Supp. at 1184-85.
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linked the second amendment with the emotional exhortations of pow-
erful lobbying organizations that seek to champion the rights it guaran-
tees. The result is a pervasive public misunderstanding of the law.
This Note will attempt to dispel some of the confusion surrounding the
nature of the right to bear arms.15
In Quilici v. Village of Morton Grove, the plaintiffs argued that the
second amendment grants an individual the right to keep and bear
arms, rather than a collective right to keep and bear arms as a member
of a well-regulated militia separate from the federal standing army.' 6
This argument presents the central issue in the controversy over the
meaning and scope of the second amendment; yet, the district court in
15. In Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143, 150 (1972) (Douglas, J., dissenting), a fourth amend-
ment search and seizure case, Justice Douglas lamented on the ease with which one can acquire a
pistol and stated:
[a] powerful lobby dins into the ears of our citizenry that these gun purchases are consti-
tutional rights protected by the Second Amendment ....
There is under our decisions no reason why stiffstate laws governing the purchase and
possession of pistols may not be enacted. There is no reason why pistols may not be
barred from anyone with a police record. There is no reason why a State may not re-
quire a purchaser of a pistol to pass a psychiatric test. There is no reason why all pistols
should not be barred to everyone except the police.
Id
Undoubtedly, Justice Douglas was referring to the National Rifle Association (N.R.A.), one of
the richest and most effective lobbying organizations in the country. With a membership of close
to 1,000,000 and about 12,000 affiliated local gun clubs, the N.R.A. certainly is the most vociferous
and influential voice for those opposed to legislation restricting handgun ownership for the aver-
age citizen. The N.R.A. has taken the responsibility "to educate public-spirited citizens in the safe
and efficient use of small arms for pleasure and protection. . . and, to further the public welfare,
law and order, and the United States defense." N. LOVING, supra note 4, at 37. Yet the N.R.A.
has greatly contributed to the perpetuation of the myth that the second amendment, contrary to a
consistent line of Supreme Court and lower federal court cases interpreting it, guarantees an invio-
lable constitutional right to each individual citizen to bear arms. Id at 4, 5. See infra notes 21-
101 and accompanying text.
16. 532 F. Supp. at 1180-83. See also Weatherup, Standing Armies and Armed Citizens: An
HistoricalAnalysis of the SecondAmendment, 2 HASTINGS CONsT. L.Q. 961, 963 (1975).
One commentator suggested that in order to avoid the metaphysical difficulty of ascertaining
how something "can exist in a whole without existing in any of its parts" the better question is for
what purposes citizens can keep and bear arms. Rohner, The Right to BearArms: A Phenomenon
vfConstitutionalHistor, 16 CATrH. U.L. REv. 53, 55 n.10 (1966). This question leads to an exami-
nation of whether self defense or recreation, for example, are constitutionally protected purposes.
If so, then the right would extend to persons reasonably fearing for their safety, and to hunters or
other sportsmen, provided they are keeping and bearing arms for those protected purposes. If,
however, the second amendment permits keeping and bearing arms only for the purpose of pro-
viding for the collective security of the people, "then the keeping and bearing may properly be
limited to those individuals exercising that function," i.e., members of the national guard or the
federal army. Id. The collective-individual right distinction, however, does provide a useful
framework for analysis.
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Morton Grove did not address this question. In Presser v. Zllinois,'7 the
United States Supreme Court held that the prohibitions of the second
amendment do not limit the power of the individual states, but only the
power of the United States Congress. tI The decision in Presser, there-
fore, required the Morton Grove court to find Morton Grove's ordi-
nance not in violation of the second amendment.' 9
Nevertheless, the individual-collective right controversy must be ex-
amined to understand what rights the second amendment guarantees.
The intent of the framers is a reliable indicator of the substantive
meaning of the Constitution and must be ascertained by analyzing the
political and social exigencies existing at the time it was written.20
I. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF THE SECOND AMENDMENT
Resentment toward oppression of military rule was the most serious
grievance the colonists voiced at the Continental Congress in Philadel-
phia in 1776. By the Revolution, the colonists were living under mar-
tial law and subject to the arbitrary exercise of power by the British
standing army.2' The hostile British troops posed a continual threat to
17. 116 U.S. 252 (1886).
18. Id. at 265. See 532 F. Supp. at 1180-81; infra notes 56-85 and accompanying text.
19. 532 F. Supp. at 1182; infra notes 55-56 and accompanying text.
20. This approach is especially necessary when dealing with the second amendment because
of the paucity of Supreme Court decisions interpreting it. See the decisions in United States v.
Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542, 553 (1875) and Presser v. Illinois, 116 U.S. 252, 265 (1886), both of
which held that the second amendment operates only as a limitation upon the power of Congress,
and not the states. In United States v. Miller, 307 U.S. 174 (1939), the Court, in its only decision
discussing the scope of the second amendment, held that courts must interpret the amendment
with the ultimate goal of maintaining a well-regulated militia. See also Miller v. Texas, 153 U.S.
535, 538 (1894) (a Texas statute prohibiting the carrying of weapons on the person held valid
because the second amendment does not apply to the states).
21. Feller & Gotting, The SecondAmendment; A SecondLook, 61 Nw. U.L. REV. 46 (1966).
The idea of a hostile standing army in their midst was repugnant to the colonists. From this
source sprang the grievances that fueled the revolutionary fervor: (1) the peacetime quartering of
troops in private homes, (2) the unaccountability and superiority of the military power to the
civilian authorities, (3) the court-martialing of civilians, (4) the presence of mercenary soldiers,
and (5) the seizure of arms belonging to the militia. Id at 49. In the recital of grievances against
King George III, the Declaration of Independence of July 4, 1776, stated:
He has kept among us, in time of peace, standing armies, without the consent of our
legislatures.
He has affected to render the military independent of and superior to the civil power
He has ... quarter[ed] large bodies of troops among us;
He has . . . protect[ed] them, by a mock trial, from punishment for any murders
which they should commit on the inhabitants of these States.
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individual liberty.22 The message sent by King George III was clear:
his large standing army would enforce his claim of absolute and un-
restricted sovereignty.23
The individual colonies, however, had always conceived of their own
militia as their true defenders and protectors of their best interest.24
The colonists viewed any attempt by Parliament or the Crown to emas-
culate their militia as an encroachment upon their liberties.25 The pres-
ervation of the militia was an interest so vital to the colonists' sense of
security, that when a company of British soldiers marched on Lexing-
ton to destroy a cache of militia arms, the alarm that followed resulted
in the first major battle of the Revolution. 26
In all the writings on the Revolutionary War and the turbulent times
preceding it, there is no evidence showing that the colonists or their
revolutionary leaders believed that they had a personal right to carry
firearms, nor that the British were violating a personal right to carry
firearms.27 The grievances of the colonists related to the presence of a
I Stat. 1 (1776). See SOURCES OF OUR LIBERTIES 319, 320 (R. Perry & J. Cooper eds. 1959). See
generally Feller & Gotting, supra; Levin, The Right to Bear Arms: The Development ofthe Ameri-
can Experience, 48 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 148 (1971); Rohner, suFra note 16; Weatherup, supra note
16; Note, The Right to Keep and Bear Arms, 26 DRAKE L. REV. 423 (1977); Note, The Impact of
State Constitutional Right to Bear Arms Provisions on State Gun Control Legislation, 38 U. CHI. L.
REv. 185 (1970).
22. Adam Smith observed that "[m]en of republican principles have been jealous of a stand-
ing army as dangerous to liberty." 2 A. SMITH, AN INQUIRY INTO THE NATURE AND CAUSES OF
THE WEALTH OF NATIONS, 706 (R. Campbell & A. Skinner eds. 1976). See United States v.
Miller, 307 U.S. 174, 179 (1939); supra note 21 and accompanying text.
23. Weatherup, supra note 16, at 977. The author noted that George III was doing in the
colonies what he could not do in England. The English Bill of Rights, enacted in 1689 as a
response to the oppression of James II, forbade the Crown from maintaining a standing army
within the kingdom during peacetime. Id at 973.
24. Feller & Gotting, supra note 21, at 51. See Note, The Right to Keep andBear Arms, supra
note 21, at 429.
25. Feller & Gotting, supra note 21, at 51. James Lovell, a preeminent political orator of the
time, noted that "[tihe true strength and safety of every commonwealth or limited monarchy, is
the bravery of its freeholders, its militia. By brave militia they rise to grandeur;, and they come to
ruin by a mercenary army." C. RoSSITER, SEEDTIME OF THE REPUBLIC 387 (1953). See Feller &
Gotting, supra note 21, at 52.
Josiah Quincy, Jr., a contemporary of Lovell, commented that, "[t]he sword should never be in
the hands of any, but those who have an interest in the safety of the community .. [s]uch [as] a
well regulated militia composed of freeholders, citizens and husbandmen . C. ROSSITER,
supra, at 387; Feller & Gotting, supra note 21, at 52.
26. Feller & Gotting, supra note 21, at 52.
27. Id at 52-53; Rohner, supra note 16, at 57-61. See also Weatherup, supra note 16, at 994-
95; infra note 33.
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hostile standing army. By attempting to disarm the various militia, the
British sought to extinguish the last potential source of colonial opposi-
tion and self-respect. The battles of Lexington and Concord were the
immediate result.2"
This was the political climate that spawned the Constitution and the
Bill of Rights. The English Bill of Rights of 1689 provided the philo-
sophical basis for its colonial counterparts, and ultimately for the Bill
of Rights of the United States Constitution.29 Fearful of military op-
pression and cognizant of the events of 17th century England, each
state included provisions regarding militia and standing armies in their
28. Feller & Gotting, supra note 21, at 53. See also Note, The Right to Keep ad Bear ,rtns,
supra note 21, at 429.
29. Feller & Gotting, supra note 21, at 48. The English Bill of Rights of 1689, 1 Will. and
Mary, sess. 2, ch. 2, was the outcome of centuries of conflict surrounding the question of the
relationship between sovereignty and armed force. Weatherup, supra note 16, at 974. In England,
as in the colonies, a militia composed of armed citizens had always been the preferred method of
providing for the common defense. Yet James II, intent on maintaining absolute rule and advanc-
ing Catholicism, systematically replaced it with a powerful standing army led by Catholics. Feller
& Gotting, supra note 21, at 48; Weatherup, supra note 16, at 973. In addition, he frequently
exercised the royal prerogative to summarily suspend and dispense with laws. SOURCES OF OUR
LIBERTIES 224 (R. Perry & J. Cooper eds. 1959). See 3 THE DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE
CONVENTIONS ON THE ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 316-17 (J. Elliot 2d ed. 1836)
[hereinafter cited as CONVENTION DEBATES]. James II's oppressive rule led to the Glorious
Revolution of 1688 (an exaggerated term for the king's humiliating exile) and the reign of William
and Mary. 1 B. SCHWARTZ, THE BILL OF RIGHTS: A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY 40 (1971);
Weatherup, supra note 16, at 973. Parliament then promulgated a declaration of rights which was
later codified into the English Bill of Rights of 1689, 1 Will. and Mary, sess. 2, ch. 2. Feller &
Gotting, supra note 21, at 48. The 1689 English Bill of Rights provided in part:
6. That the raising or keeping a standing army within the kingdom in time of peace,
unless it be with the consent of parliament, is against law.
7. That the subjects which are protestants, may have arms for their defense suitable to
their conditions, and as allowed by law.
1 Will. and Mary, sess. 2, ch. 2, citedin SOURCES OF OUR LIBERTIES 246 (R. Perry & J. Cooper
eds. 1959).
When considered in its historical context, it is clear that the English Bill of Rights granted no
personal right to bear arms. In fact, existing laws prohibited possession of firearms by anyone
other than nobility and heirs of wealthy landowners. The right granted to protestants was partici-
pation in the militia in order to provide for the defense of the realm. Weatherup, supra note 16, at
974; Feller & Gotting, supra note 21, at 48. Its insertion in the English Bill of Rights served as
Parliament's notice to any future monarch that an abandonment of the militia in favor of a stand-
ing army would not be tolerated absent its consent. Weatherup, srqpra note 16, at 974. Individual
self-defense was not the motivating purpose behind this right. Feller & Gotting, supra note 21, at
48. See Weatherup, supra note 16, at 964-74. See generaly R. POUND, THE DEVELOPMENT OF
CONSTITUTIONAL GUARANTEES OF LIBERTY 179-82 (1957); C. RoSSITER, supra note 25, at 32-33;
B. SCHWARTZ, supra, at 40-46; Levin, supra note 21, at 151-52; Rohner, supra note 16, at 58-59.
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bills of rights. 30 An examination of the proposals submitted to the state
ratifying conventions for a federal Bill of Rights, and the provisions
relating to arms in each state's bill of rights, persuasively suggests the
framers' intent to ensure retention of state power by maintaining an
effective militia as an instrument of defense.3 The primary concern of
the framers was to avoid a recurrence of the grievances which led to the
30. Levin, supra note 21, at 148-50. Virginia's declaration of rights served as a model for
several state constitutions. The Virginia declaration provided:
[t]hat a well-regulated militia, composed of the body of the people, trained to arms, is the
proper, natural, and safe defense of a Free State; that standing armies, in time of peace,
should be avoided, as dangerous to liberty; and that in all cases the military should be
under strict subordination to and, governed by the civil power.
Id at 152. See SOURCES OF OUR LIBERTIES 312 (R. Perry & J. Cooper eds. 1959); 1 B.
SCHWARTZ, supra note 29, at 239; Feller & Gotting, supra note 21, at 53. The provisions of other
states were similar to that of Maryland:
XXV. That a well-regulated militia is the proper and natural defense of a free
government.
XXVII. That in all cases, and at all times, the military ought to be under strict subor-
dination to and control of the civil power.
XXVIII. That no soldier ought to be quartered in any house, in time of peace, without
the consent of the owner; and in time of war, in such manner only, as the
Legislature directs.
XXIX. That no person, except regular soldiers, mariners, and Marines in the service
of this State, or militia when in actual service, ought in any case to be subject
to or punishable by martial law.
Cited in SOURCES OF OUR LIBERTIES, supra, at 348. Levin, supra note 21, at 152.
Only four states make any reference in their bills of rights to a right to bear arms. North
Carolina limits the right to "defense of the state," while Massachusetts provides the right for the
"common defense." Only Pennsylvania and Vermont grant the people the right to bear arms for
"themselves and the state." 1 B. SCHWARTZ, supra note 29, at 266, 287, 324, 342-43. New York's
constitution, adopted in 1777, makes no mention of a right to bear arms, but provides that war
material be maintained throughout the state. Id at 312.
31. See supra note 30. The Virginia Ratifying Convention of June, 1788, was especially con-
cerned with what kind of power Congress would have over the state's militia. Feller & Gotting,
supra note 21, at 59-60. George Mason, who almost exclusively drafted Virginia's bill of rights,
stated:
There are various ways of destroying the militia. A standing army may be perpetually
established in their stead. I abominate and detest the idea of government, where there is
a standing army. The militia may be here destroyed by that method which has been
practised in other parts of the world before; that is, by rendering them useless-by dis-
arming them. Under various pretences, Congress may neglect to provide for arming and
disciplining the militia; and the state governments cannot do it, for Congress has an
exclusive right to arm them ....
CONVENTION DEBATES, supra note 29, at 379; Weatherup, supra note 16, at 991. All eyes were on
the Virginia Convention, With its wealth, prestige, and large population, it was inconceivable that
there could be a union of the states without Virginia. Feller & Gotting, supra note 21, at 59.
There is no evidence that the delegates to the Virginia Convention were concerned with an indi-
vidual right to carry arms. Id at 60. See also Rohner, supra note 16, at 57.
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Revolutionary War.32 The new nation would not tolerate a federal
standing army. The second amendment was a constitutional mandate
to guarantee the preservation of the local militia, the citizen-army, as
the guardian of the country's liberty.3 History clearly supports this
collective right interpretation of the second amendment. 4
II. FEDERAL CONSTITUTIONAL ISSUES
In United States v. Miller35 the Supreme Court addressed the issue of
the substantive meaning of its decision in Presser v. Illinois,36 namely,
that the second amendment does not apply to the states. Although the
district court in Morton Grove failed to consider Morton Grove's Ordi-
nance No. 81-11 in light of the Presser holding,37 any discussion of the
meaning of the second amendment must examine the controversial lan-
guage of Miller.
Miller involved a prosecution under the National Firearms Act of
1934.38 The Court rejected Mr. Miller's claim that his conviction for
interstate transportation of an unregistered sawed-off shotgun violated
32. Rohner, supra note 16, at 56-57.
33. Id Rohner noted that colonists undoubtedly were concerned with protection against wild
animals, robbers, and Indian attacks. These considerations, however, had no real influence on
Congress or the various state ratifying conventions in formulating and adopting the second
amendment. Id at 57. Rohner concluded that there is no "respectable authority for the proposi-
tion that, as of 1791, the Constitution's guaranty of the right to bear arms extended generally to
personal self-defense as that concept was applied in the common law." Id at 60. Rather, the right
to keep and bear arms as contemplated by the second amendment
is a political right of the populace generally to maintain a state of military preparedness
against the possibility of domestic or foreign military impositions. The only obstacle to
crossing the threshold and embracing this conclusion is the faint echo and uncertain
language of courts, commentators, and legislatures, suggesting that the "right" long ante-
dates any constitutional recognition of it, and, includes purposes broader than collective
security.
Id at 60-61. See also Weatherup, supra note 16, at 994-95; Cf. Levin, supra note 21, at 166 (right
to bear arms is "anachronistie"). See generally C. BAKA, THE RIGHT TO BEAR ARMS (1966); E.
DUMBAULD, supra note 29; CONVENTION DEBATES, supra note 29; C. ROSSITER, stera note 25; 1
B. SCHWARTZ, supra note 29.
34. See supra note 16 and accompanying text.
35. 307 U.S. 174 (1939). The Miller case is the first and only Supreme Court opinion provid-
ing guidance on the meaning and scope of protection granted by the second amendment.
36. 116 U.S. 252, 265 (1886). See infra notes 52-76 and accompanying text. See also United
States v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542, 553 (1875).
37. 532 F. Supp. at 1171.
38. 26 U.S.C. §§ 1132-1132q (1934) (current version at 26 U.S.C. §§ 5801-5872 (1976)). Sec-
tion 1132 defined "firearm" as "a shotgun or rifle having a barrel of less than eighteen inches in
length .. " 307 U.S. at 175 n.l. The National Firearms Act of 1934 was actually part of the
Internal Revenue Code and imposed a heavy tax on importers, manufacturers, dealers, and trans-
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his rights under the second amendment.39 The Court stated that the
obvious purpose of the second amendment was to maintain the effec-
tiveness of the militia. Because the defendant could not show how the
possession or use of a sawed-off shotgun bore a "reasonable relation-
ship to the preservation or efficiency of a well regulated militia," the
Court held that the second amendment did not guarantee the defend-
ant a right to keep such a weapon.40
By noting that a sawed-off shotgun is not "part of the ordinary mili-
tary equipment" and its use could not "contribute to the common de-
fense,"' 41 the Court arguably established a test for determining a
person's right to bear arms. According to this language in Miller, if an
individual could prove that his weapon is one normally used by the
ferors of sawed-off shotguns, machine guns, and similar weapons. Id See Rohner, supra note 16,
at 64.
The National Firearms Act of 1934 was the first federal statute dealing with the control of
firearms. It was followed in 1938 by the Federal Firearms Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 901-909 (1938) (re-
pealed 1968). The Federal Firearms Act was enacted under the Commerce Clause and prohibited
the interstate shipment or receipt of firearms to or by felons or fugitives from justice. Rohner,
supra note 16, at 64. It also prohibited the shipment of stolen firearms and mandated that dealers
and manufacturers obtain licenses for their regular shipment of weapons. Id
While the above two statutes emerged from the prohibition era, the political assassinations of
the 1960's provided the impetus for the Gun Control Act of 1968, consisting of 18 U.S.C. §§ 921-
28 (1976) and 18 U.S.C. app. § 1202 (1976). The former is designed to punish any material mis-
representation concerning an otherwise legal weapons purchase. Specifically, failure to indicate
that one is a convicted felon on a registration form during the purchase of a weapon violates 18
U.S.C. § 922(g) and (h), which prohibit such persons from receiving or transporting weapons. 18
U.S.C. app. § 1202(a) proscribes the possession, receipt, or transportation in interstate commerce
of firearms by persons Congress has deemed likely to misuse them, including convicted felons,
mental incompetents, dishonorably discharged servicemen, persons renouncing their citizenship,
and illegal aliens. See, e.g., Barrett v. United States, 423 U.S. 212, 217, 219-20 (1976); Huddleston
v. United States, 415 U.S. 814, 824-29 (1974); United States v. Graves, 554 F.2d 65, 69-70 (3d Cir.
1977); J. ALVIANI & W. DRAKE, HANDGUN CONTROL-IssuES AND ALTERNATIVES 24 (1975).
For a critical analysis of the Gun Control Act of 1968, see Zimring, Firearms and Federal Law:
The Gun ControlAct of 1968, 4 J. LEGAL STUD. 133, 197 (1975), in which the author concluded
that "Congress is unprepared to make intelligent policy choices concerning the federal role in
firearms legislation." Id
39. 307 U.S. at 178.
40. Id In upholding the validity of the National Firearms Act of 1934, see supra note 38, the
Court held:
In the absence of any evidence tending to show that possession or use of a "shotgun
having a barrel of less than eighteen inches in length" at this time has some reasonable
relationship to the preservation or efficiency of a well regulated militia, we cannot say
that the Second Amendment guarantees the right to keep and bear such an instrument.
Certainly it is not within judicial notice that this weapon is any part of the ordinary
military equipment or that its use could contribute to the common defense.
307 U.S. at 178.
41. 307 U.S. at 178.
Washington University Open Scholarship
1098 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY [Vol. 60:1087
military, he would have an absolute right under the second amendment
to keep the weapon.42 Justice McReynolds, writing for a unanimous
Court, undermined individual right interpretations of the second
amendment, however, by declaring that the amendment must be inter-
preted with the "end in view" of maintaining and preserving the mili-
tia.43 Manifestly, the second amendment appears to have been
42. Id This language has been the source of much confusion and uncertainty. In Cases v.
United States, 131 F.2d 916 (1st Cir. 1942), cert. deniedsub nom. Velazquez v. United States, 319
U.S. 770 (1943), the First Circuit grappled with the ambiguity created by the Miller decision.
Against a second amendment challenge, the court upheld a conviction for the receipt of firearms
in violation of the National Firearms Act and stated "that the Supreme Court [in Miller] was
attempting to formulate a general rule applicable to all cases. The rule which it laid down was
adequate to dispose of the case before it and that we think was as far as the Supreme Court
intended to go." 131 F.2d at 922. The court in Cases noted that if the Miller case provides the
general rule, then the second amendment would prevent Congress from regulating the private
possession or use of "distinctly military arms, such as machine guns, trench mortars and anti-tank
or anti-aircraft guns" because those weapons are used in the maintenance ofa militia. The Court
noted that it was unlikely that the framers of the Constitution intended any such result. Id See
Weatherup, supra note 16, at 999. In finding that Mr. Cases had discharged his weapon into a
night club and at one of the club's patrons, the court sardonically concluded that such use of a
weapon was in no way intended to further Mr. Cases' military training nor contribute to the
efficiency of a well-regulated militia. 131 F.2d at 922-23. See Rohner, mpra note 16, at 65.
In United States v. Warin, 530 F.2d 103 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 426 U.S. 948 (1976), the court
upheld a conviction under the National Firearms Act. Referring to the disputed language in
United States v. Miller, 307 U.S. 174, 178 (1939), the Warin court stated:
In Miller, the Supreme Court did not reach the question of the extent to which a
weapon which is "part of the ordinary military equipment" or whose "use could contrib-
ute to the common defense" may be regulated. In holding that the absence of evidence
placing the weapon involved in the charges against Miller [a sawed-off shotgun] in one of
these categories precluded the indictment on Second Amendment grounds, the Court did
not hold the converse-that the Second Amendment is an absolute prohibition against
all regulation of the manufacture, transfer and possession of any instrument capable of
being used in military action.
530 F.2d at 105-06.
43. Weatherup, supra note 16, at 999. Justice McReynolds stated:
The Constitution as originally adopted granted to the Congress power---"To provide
for calling forth the Militia to execute the Laws of the Union, suppress Insurrections and
repel Invasions; To provide for organizing, arming, and disciplining, the Militia. . ....
with obvious purpose to assure the continuation and render possible the effectiveness of
such forces the declaration and guarantee of the Second Amendment were made. It
must be interpreted and applied with that end in view.
307 U.S. at 178. In United States v. Tot, 131 F.2d 261 (3d Cir. 1942), rev'don other grounds, 319
U.S. 463 (1943), the court upheld the Federal Firearms Act of 1938, 18 U.S.C. App. § 1202 (1938),
and stated: "[w]eapon bearing was never treated as anything like an absolute right under the
common law." 131 F.2d at 266. The court also noted that the second amendment "was not
adopted with individual rights in mind, but as protection for the States in the maintenance of their
Militia organizations against possible encroachments by the federal power." Id See also United
States v. Adams, 11 F. Supp. 216, 218 (S.D. Fla. 1935). In Stevens v. United States, 440 F.2d 144
(6th Cir. 1971), a case upholding the constitutionality of 18 U.S.C. app. § 1202(a)(1) (1938), which
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designed to protect the state militia from destruction by the federal
government. It did not create a personal right, inviolable by either
state or federal authorities.44
In Morton Grove, the Village contended that even if the second
amendment did apply to the rights of states, Morton Grove's ban on
the possession of handguns did not interfere with preservation of the
militia in Illinois.45 The Village noted that the Illinois National Guard
is the military force of Illinois,46 and pointed out that the federal gov-
ernment has taken responsibility for the funding and arming of the Na-
prohibits the possession of firearms by convicted felons, the court stated: "[slince the Second
Amendment right 'to keep and bear arms' applies only to the right of the State to maintain a
militia and not to the individual's right to bear arms, there can be no serious claim to any express
constitutional right of the individual to possess a firearm." Id. at 149.
44. Weatherup, supra note 16, at 1000-01. Numerous federal court decisions have adopted
the collective right interpretation of the second amendment as expounded in United States v.
Miller, 37 U.S. 174 (1939). Narrowly construing the second amendment to guarantee only the
right to bear arms as a member of a militia, these cases have consistently found no conflict be-
tween federal gun laws and the second amendment. See, e.g., Lewis v. United States, 445 U.S. 55
(1980); United States v. Miller, 307 U.S. 174 (1939); United States v. Oakes, 564 F.2d 384 (10th
Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 926 (1978); United States v. Graves, 554 F.2d 65 (3d Cir. 1977);
United States v. King, 532 F.2d 505 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 960 (1976); United States v.
Warin, 530 F.2d 103 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 426 U.S. 948 (1976); United States v. Johnson, 497
F.2d 548 (4th Cir. 1974); Eckert v. City of Philadelphia, 477 F.2d 610 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 414
U.S. 839 (1973); United States v. Day, 476 F.2d 562 (6th Cir. 1973); Cody v. United States, 460
F.2d 34 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1010 (1972); United States v. Williams, 446 F.2d 486 (5th
Cir. 1971); United States v. Decker, 446 F.2d 164 (8th Cir. 1971); Stevens v. United States, 440
F.2d 144 (6th Cir. 1971); Castellano v. United States, 350 F.2d 852 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 383
U.S. 949 (1968); United States v. Tot, 131 F.2d 852 (10th Cir.), rev'don other grounds, 319 U.S.
463 (1943); United States v. Adams, I1 F. Supp. 216 (S.D. Fla. 1935). See also Adams v. Wil-
liams, 407 U.S. 143, 150-51 (1972) (Douglas, J., dissenting). See generally Note, Prior Convictions
and the Gun ControlAct of 1968, 76 COLUM. L. REv. 326 (1976).
45. Brief for Defendant at 15, Quilici v. Village of Morton Grove, 532 F. Supp. 1169 (N.D.
I11. 1981). The plaintiffs had argued that "since the handgun has been for hundreds of years, and
continues to be ... a part of the ordinary military equipment . . . its possession has a direct
relationship to the preservation and efficiency of a well-regulated militia." Reply Brief for Plain-
tiff at 6.
46. Brief for Defendant at 16; ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 129, § 220.05 (1979). ILL. REV. STAT. ch.
129, §§ 220.04, 220.09 (1979), subject the Illinois National Guard to all applicable federal regula-
tions and legislation. See also The Act of January 21, 1903, ch.196, § 1, 32 Stat. 775 (1903) (cur-
rent version at 10 U.S.C. § 311 (1976)), in which Congress, pursuant to its authority under article
I, section 8, of the Constitution, provided that, "the organized militia [is] to be known as the
National Guard of the State, Territory, or District of Columbia, or by such other designations as
may be given them by the laws of the respective States or Territories." Id In 10 U.S.C. § 311
(1976), Congress amended the above provision and stated that, "the unorganized militia, which
consists of the members of the militia who are not members of the National Guard. .. " is given
no recognized status. See generally Feller & Gotting, sufpra note 21, at 64.
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tional Guard.47 The Guard does not rely upon an armed citizenry for
its supply of weapons, nor for the training of its soldiers.48 Certainly,
these facts render meaningless any suggestion that Morton Grove's ban
on handguns interferes with the maintenance of the militia under the
decision in Miller.49
The critical inquiry in disposing of the federal constitutional issues in
Morton Grove was whether the second amendment applies to the
states." The plaintiffs argued that the drafters of the fourteenth
amendment intended the second amendment to apply to states as well
as to the federal government.5 ' The primary response of the Village
simply pointed to the Supreme Court's decision in Presser which held
that the second amendment was solely a limitation upon Congress, not
the states.52
In Presser, the defendant was convicted of marching his armed
paramilitary organization, the Lehr and Wehr Verein, through the
streets of Chicago. At issue was the constitutionality of an Illinois stat-
ute forbidding private organizations from parading with arms without
a license from the Governor. 3 The Court rejected Mr. Presser's argu-
ment that the Illinois statute violated the second amendment and stated
47. Brief for Defendant at 16; 32 U.S.C. §§ 106, 701 (1976).
48. Brief for Defendant at 16. ILL. REv. STAT., ch. 129, § 220.57 (1979) forbids the removal
of national guard weapons from their authorized storage places except for use in service. 32
U.S.C. §§ 501, 502 (1976) and ILL. REV. STAT., ch. 129, §§ 220.29, 220.31 (1979) provides for the
training of all members of the national guard.
49. The Village noted in its brief that even if the Illinois National Guard did employ hand-
guns supplied by members of the citizenry, and even if the Guard required its members to train
themselves in the use of their weapons, the Morton Grove ordinance would still not hamper the
Guard's operations. Brief for Defendant at 17. Morton Grove, Ill., Ordinance 81-11
§ 132.102(E)(7), (10) (June 8, 1981), permits the possession and use of handguns at licensed gun
clubs. Consequently, members of the Illinois National Guard residing in Morton Grove would be
able to train with their privately owned pistols simply by joining or forming a gun club. Brief for
Defendant at 17. The obvious conclusion was that Ordinance No. 81-11 has no bearing on the
effectiveness of the Illinois National Guard. The Village noted that the suggestion that the main-
tenance of the militia (as contemplated by United States v. Miller, 307 U.S. 174, 178 (1930))
depends upon the continuation or creation of a citizenry armed with military weapons, is frighten-
ingly anachronistic. Brief for Defendant at 18.
50. 532 F. Supp. at 1169.
51. Id at 1180. See Reply Brief for Plaintiff at 11-16.
52. 116 U.S. 252-65 (1886). In United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542 (1875), a case not
directly concerned with the right to bear arms or the militia but with civil rights legislation, the
Court stated that the second amendment "has no other effect than to restrict the powers of the
National Government." Id at'553. The Cruikshank decision was found controlling by the Court
in Presser. See infra note 54. See also Levin, supra note 21, at 163..
53. 116 U.S. at 253-54. See 532 F. Supp. at 1180.
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that the second amendment limits "only the power of Congress and the
national government."" o
The district court in Morton Grove was bound by the holding of
Presser that the second amendment was not incorporated into the four-
teenth, and therefore did not serve as a check on the power of the state
legislature or municipal councils in Illinois." As the Supreme Court's
most recent pronouncement on this issue, the Presser decision is
controlling.5 6
The plaintiffs in Morton Grove, however, advanced two principal ar-
guments in favor of ignoring the holding in Presser.57 First, the plain-
tiffs contended that a proper reading of Presser supports their position
that Morton Grove's ordinance violates the second amendment. Sec-
ond, they argued that whatever the interpretation of Presser, it is no
54. 116 U.S. at 265. The Presser Court stated:
[A] conclusive answer to the contention that this amendment prohibits the legislation in
question lies in the fact that the amendment is a limitation only upon the power of
Congress and the National government, and not upon that of the States. It was so held
by this court in the case of United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542, 553, in which the
Chief Justice, in delivering the judgment of the court, said, that the right of the people to
keep and bear arms "is not a right granted by the Constitution. Neither is it in any
manner dependent upon that instrument for its existence. The Second Amendment de-
clares that it shall not be infringed, but this, as has been seen, means no more than that it
shall not be infringed by Congress. This is one of the amendments that has no other
effect than to restrict the powers of the National government, leaving the people to look
for their protection against any violation by their fellow-citizens of the rights it recog-
nizes to what is called in The Citi of New York v. MViln, 11 Pet. [102] 139, the 'powers
which relate to merely municipal legislation, or what was perhaps more properly called
internal police,' 'not surrendered or restrained' by the constitution of the United States."
Id
55. 532 F. Supp. at 1182.
56. See Hendricks County Rural Elec. Membership Corp. v. NLRB, 627 F.2d 766, 769 (7th
Cir. 1980) ("decisions of the Supreme Court of the United States and their clear implications [are]
absolutely binding on inferior federal courts. ... ), rev'd on other grounds, 50 U.S.L.W. 4037
(1981); Ahern v. Murphy, 457 F.2d 363, 365 (7th Cir. 1972) (Supreme Court's opinion on a subject
is dispositive as a matter of stare decisis); Port Auth. Bondholders Protective Comm. v. Port of
N.Y. Auth., 387 F.2d 259, 262 n.3 (2d Cir. 1967) ("inferior federal courts had best adhere to the
view" that the Supreme Court's pronouncement on a subject is the law); United States v. Chase,
281 F.2d 225, 230 (7th Cir. 1960) (appellate court believed it was obligated to follow a frequently
criticized, dated Supreme Court holding because of its applicability to the situation before it).
57. 532 F. Supp. at 1181-82. The plaintiffs also argued that the history of the fourteenth
amendment, the Supreme Court's changing views on the subject of incorporation, and early state
cases discussing the right to bear arms required the district court to find that Morton Grove's
ordinance infringed the second amendment. I. at 1181 n.5. The district court stated, however,
that to reach such a conclusion would flagrantly disregard the Supreme Court's holding in Presser.
It therefore found these arguments irrelevant. Id Should Morton Grove reach the Supreme
Court, however, those arguments by the plaintiffs become quite relevant. See infra notes 67-74
and accompanying text.
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longer good law. In effect, the plaintiffs contended that subsequent
Supreme Court cases incorporating many of the first ten amendments
into the fourteenth amendment have overruled Presser sub silentio.5s
The district court found neither argument persuasive.59
In arguing that the Village had misread Presser, the plaintiffs pointed
to a phrase in the Presser decision which provided that "the States can-
not. . . prohibit the people from keeping and bearing arms."'60 The
district court in Morton Grove noted that this language, when read in
context, actually supported the position of the Village, and not the
plaintiffs'." According to the court in Morton Grove, the Supreme
Court's position in Presser was that an individual has the right to keep
and bear arms whenever the federal government requires him to do so
as a member of the armed forces, or in the absence of any regulation.62
Relying on language of the Supreme Court in Mayor of New York v.
Min,63 quoted by the Court in Presser, the Morton Grove court indi-
58. 532 F. Supp. at 1182.
59. Id
60. Id at 1181. See Presser, 116 U.S. at 265.
61. 532 F. Supp. at 1181-82. The entire phrase from Presser reads as follows:
The States cannot, even laying the constitutional provision in question out of view, pro-
hibit the people from keeping and bearing arms, so as to deprive the United States of
their rightful resource for maintaining the public security, and disable the people from
performing their duty to the general government.
116 U.S. at 265.
62. 532 F. Supp. at 1182. One wonders, however, how it can be said that an individual has a
"right" to do that which the federal government may compel him to do. In this context, perhaps
the right to bear arms can more accurately be described as a duty.
One commentator noted that the Supreme Court's concern in 1886, only twenty years after the
Civil War, with state attempts to weaken the central government by withholding arms and troops
from national service, was quite understandable. Such a position, however, is a complete reversal
from the aims of the framers of the Constitution and the Bill of Rights. The concern at that time
was with limiting the military power of the central government vis-a-vis the states. Through the
mid-19th century to the present, the United States has maintained and relied upon a large national
standing army. Levin, supra note 21, at 163. See 532 F. Supp. at 1181-82; supra note 54.
Another commentator noted that the language referred to in Presser, see supra note 54, "implies
that the federal responsibility for military operations is sufficient in and of itself to preclude state
interference with militia readiness." Rohner, supra note 16, at 68. But as already discussed, today
the federal government supplies the weapons to the militia (national guard). It is therefore errone-
ous to suggest that any state regulation of privately owned firearms would interfere with militia
readiness, and thus with the ability of the United States to maintain public security. 532 F. Supp.
at 1181. See supra notes 47-48 and accompanying text.
63. 36 U.S. (11 Pet.) 102 (1837). The Supreme Court in Mi/n stated:
[A] state has the same undeniable and unlimited jurisdiction over al persons and things
... where that jurisdiction is not surrendered or restrained by the constitution of the
United States. . . . [A]ll those powers which relate to merely municipal legislation, or
what may, perhaps, more properly be called internalpolice, are not thus surrendered or
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cated that under the proper circumstances, the right to keep and bear
arms may be circumscribed by a state through the valid exercise of its
police power.64 The court in Morton Grove held that the ordinance in
question was a valid exercise of the police power.65 Presser and Miln
require nothing more.66
The plaintiffs next argued that subsequent Supreme Court decisions
had overruled Presser sub silentio.67  The argument did not, however,
persuade the Morton Grove court.6" Although many rights enumerated
in the Bill of Rights have been incorporated into the fourteenth amend-
ment and thus apply to the states,69 the second amendment has not had
that distinction.7" In Adamson v. California,7' the Supreme Court held
nearly the entire Bill of Rights applicable to the states. The plaintiffs in
Morton Grove relied heavily on Justice Black's dissent in Adamson
restrained; and that, consequently, in relation to these, the authority of a state is com-
plete, unqualified and exclusive.
Id at 138 (emphasis in original). See also 116 U.S. at 265 (1886).
64. 532 F. Supp. at 1182.
65. See infra notes 102-20 and accompanying text.
66. 532 F. Supp. at 1182.
67. Id
68. Id
69. L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTrrUTIONAL LAW § 11-2 (1978). Professor Tribe noted that
the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment has been held to protect the rights to just
compensation, see Chicago B. & Q.R. Co. v. Chicago, 166 U.S. 226 (1897); to freedom of speech,
see Fiske v. Kansas, 274 U.S. 380 (1927); the press, see Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697 (1931);
assembly, see DeJonge v. Oregon, 299 U.S. 353 (1937); petition, see Hague v. CIO, 307 U.S. 496
(1939); free exercise of religion, see Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 US. 296 (1940), and nonestab-
lishment of religion, see Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1 (1947); the fourth amendment rights
to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures, see Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25 (1949), and
to exclude from criminal trials evidence illegally seized, see Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961);
the fifth amendment rights to be free of compelled self-incrimination, see Malloy v. Hogan, 378
U.S. 1 (1964), and double jeopardy, see Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784 (1969); the sixth
amendment right to counsel, see Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963); to a speedy trial, see
Klopfer v. North Carolina, 386 U.S. 213 (1967); to a public trial, see In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257
(1948); trial before a jury, see Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 (1968); to an opportunity to
confront opposing witnesses, see Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400 (1965), and to compulsory process
for the purpose of obtaining favorable witnesses, see Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S. 14 (1967); and
the eighth amendment right to be free from cruel and unusual punishments, see Robinson v.
California, 370 U.S. 660 (1962). TRIBE, supra, at § 11-2.
Courts have sometimes held that some Bill of Rights provisions, along with the second amend-
ment, do not apply to the states. See, e.g., Watson v. Jago, 558 F.2d 330 (6th Cir. 1977) (fifth
amendment right to indictment by a grand jury); lacaponi v. New Amsterdam Casualty Co., 258
F. Supp. 880 (W.D. Pa. 1966) (seventh amendment right to a jury trial in civil cases), afl'd, 379
F.2d 311 (3d Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 1054 (1968). See also 532 F. Supp. at 1182.
70. 532 F. Supp. at 1182.
71. 332 U.S. 46 (1947).
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which advocated total incorporation of the Bill of Rights into the four-
teenth amendment.72 As Justice Harlan noted in Poe v. Ullman, 3 how-
ever, the Supreme Court has consistently resisted the idea that the
fourteenth amendment serves only as a shorthand reference to the ex-
plicit terms of the Bill of Rights.74
The district court in Morton Grove concluded that because Presser is
still good law, that decision required the Morton Grove court to hold
that the second amendment does not apply to the states or their polit-
ical subdivisions.7 5 Consequently, Morton Grove's ordinance banning
the possession of handguns does not infringe upon the second
amendment.76
The plaintiffs also argued that the ninth amendment to the Constitu-
tion77 protects a right to bear arms for the purpose of self-defense.78
72. 532 F. Supp. at 1182. See 332 U.S. at 71-72 (Black, J., dissenting). Justice Black believed
that the intent of the fourteenth amendment was "to make the Bill of Rights, applicable to the
states." Id Justices Murphy, Rutledge, and Douglas concurred with Justice Black on this point,
and the Court thus "came within one vote of holding that the fourteenth amendment guaranteed
that 'no state could deprive its citizens of the privileges and protections of the Bill of Rights.'" L.
TRIBE, supra note 69, at § 11-2. The notion of full incorporation, however, has never commanded
a majority of the Court. Nor has this idea won scholarly approval. Id See, e.g., Fairman, Does
the Fourteenth Amendment Incorporate the Bill of Rights? The Original Understanding, 2 STAN. L.
REv. 5 (1949).
73. 367 U.S. 497 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
74. Id at 541. See Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 10-11 (1964); Ohio ex rel. Eaton v. Price,
364 U.S. 263, 275 (1960) (Brennan, J., dissenting). See also 532 F. Supp. at 1182.
75. 532 F. Supp. at 1182.
76. Id The principle ofPresser has never been specifically challenged. In fact, the Supreme
Court has not heard a case presenting a second amendment challenge to a state statute regulating
firearms since Miller v. Texas, 153 U.S. 535 (1894), in which the Court upheld the state regulation
on the basis of United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542 (1875). See supra notes 52 & 54.
Numerous state and lower federal courts have followed the principle of Cruikshank and
Presser. See, e.g., Cases v. United States, 131 F.2d 916 (1st Cir. 1942), cert. denied, 319 U.S. 770;
State v. Swanton, 129 Ariz. 131, 629 P.2d 98 (Ct. App. 1981); Fife v. State, 31 Ark. 455 (1876);
Commonwealth v. Davis, 369 Mass. 886, 343 N.E.2d 847 (1976); In re Atkinson, 291 N.W.2d 396
(Minn. 1980); State v. Keet, 269 Mo. 206, 190 S.W. 573 (1916); State v. Shelby, 90 Mo. 302, 2 S.W.
468 (1886); Harris v. State, 83 Nev. 404, 432 P.2d 929 (1967); State v. Sanne, 116 N.H. 583, 364
A.2d 630 (1976); People v. Persce, 204 N.Y. 397, 97 N.E. 877 (1912); State v. Kerner, 181 N.C. 574,
107 S.E. 222 (1921); McCollum v. City of Cincinnati, 51 Ohio App. 67, 199 N.E. 603 (1935); Ex
parte Thomas, 21 Okla. 770, 97 Pac. 260 (1908); Andrews v. State, 50 Tenn. (3 Heisk.) 165 (1871);
Carwell & Smith v. State, 148 S.W. 1159 (Tex. Civ. App. 1912). See generally Rohner, supra note
16, at 66; supra note 44.
77. The ninth amendment to the United States Constitution states: "[tihe enumeration in the
Constitution of certain rights, shall not be construed to deny or disparage others retained by the
people." U.S. CONsT. amend. IX. See B. PATrERSON, THE FORGOTTEN NINTH AMENDMENT 19
(1955), in which the author noted that "[t]he Ninth Amendment to the Constitution is a basic
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The plaintiffs suggested that this inherent right was expounded by sev-
eral famous natural law philosophers, including Aristotle, Cicero, and
John Locke.7 9 They also cited several early English common-law deci-
sions that recognized the right of individuals to bear arms for the de-
fense of their persons and homes.80
The court in Morton Grove rejected this argument, despite its obvi-
ous appeal, and noted that the Supreme Court has never explicitly held
that the ninth amendment protects any particular right.8 ' Quoting Gris-
wold v. Connecticut,"z the district court noted that the only individual
rights warranting constitutional protection without explicit enumera-
tion in the Bill of Rights are the truly personal rights to privacy in
matters relating to the family and procreation. 3 The court in Morton
Grove concluded that the Supreme Court has never recognized a right
of self-defense or to carry handguns, either under penumbra theory or
directly under the ninth amendment.8 4 Consequently, the Morton
statement of the inherent natural rights of the individual." Id See also Reply Brief for Plaintiff at
17-27.
78. 532 F. Supp. at 1183.
79. Id The plaintiffs, in their reply brief, quoted Cicero from IN DEFENSE OF TITUS ANNIUS
MILO, SELECTED POLITICAL SPEECHES 222 (M. Grant trans. 1969):
[I]f our lives are endangered by plots or violence or armed robbers or enemies, any and
every method of protecting ourselves is morally right. When weapons reduce them to
silence, the laws no longer expect one to await their pronouncements. For people who
decide to wait for these will have to wait for justice, too-and meanwhile they must
suffer injustice first.
Id See Reply Brief for Plaintiff at 19.
80. See, e.g., Rex v. Thompson, 100 Eng. Rep. 10 (K.B. 1787) (it "is not an offense to keep or
use a gun"); Wingfield v. Stratford, 96 Eng. Rep. 787 (K.B. 1752) (a gun may be kept for defense
of one's home); Rex v. Gardner, 87 Eng. Rep. 1240 (K.B. 1739) (game law did not prohibit a man
from carrying a gun for self defense).
81. 532 F. Supp. at 1183.
82. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
83. 532 F. Supp. at 1183. In Griswold, the Supreme Court held that the "zone of privacy
created by several fundamental constitutional guarantees" forbade the enforcement against a mar-
ried couple of a Connecticut statute prohibiting the use of contraceptives. 381 U.S. at 485. See
Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494 (1977) (ordinance regulating the occupancy of
housing by selecting certain categories of relatives who may live together and declaring that others
may not held a violation of the strong constitutional protection of the sanctity of the family); Roe
v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (state criminal abortion law held to violate the due process clause of
the fourteenth amendment, which protects the right to privacy against state action, including a
woman's qualified right to terminate her pregnancy).
84. 532 F. Supp. at 1183. The district court in Morton Grove noted that the Supreme Court
explicitly discussed the reach of the ninth amendment in only one case. In a concurring opinion in
Griswold, Justice Goldberg argued that the ninth amendment protects those fundamental rights
which derive from the "traditions and [collective] conscience of our people." 381 U.S. at 493
(quoting Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 105 (1934)). See also N. DORSEN, THE RIGHTS OF
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Grove ordinance is not unconstitutional under the ninth amendment 5
Two of the three plaintiffs alleged in their complaints that the Mor-
ton Grove ordinance constituted an illegal taking of private property
and thus violated the fifth amendment to the Constitution.86 Although
the two plaintiffs abandoned this argument in the memoranda submit-
ted to the district court, the court briefly addressed the issue. 7
The court first stated the well-settled principle that a government
taking of private property can occur under the fifth amendment
through a valid exercise of the police power.88 Only when such taking
results in destruction of use and enjoyment of a person's legitimate pri-
vate property rights must the government provide compensation.8 9
The district court noted that the Morton Grove ordinance does not
have such a drastic effect.9° According to the ordinance, Morton Grove
residents not wishing to surrender their handguns to the police9 may
either sell or otherwise dispose of them outside Morton Grove. 2 In
addition, the ordinance allows handgun owners not wishing to sell their
weapons to simply register and store them at a licensed gun club.93
Licensed gun collectors are exempted from the ordinance altogether.94
Finally, the court rejected plaintiff Quilici's argument that Ordinance
No. 81-11 is unconstitutionally vague.95 The ordinance defines "hand-
gun" as "a firearm of a size which may be concealed upon the per-
son." 96 Mr. Quilici suggested that this definition may apply to
AMERICANS 153 (1970). The court in Morton Grove concluded, however, that "whatever the ap-
peal of such an analysis, Justice Goldberg's thesis has never been accepted by a majority of the
Supreme Court. Consequently, the ninth amendment furnishes no support for the plaintiffs' fun-
damental right argument." 532 F. Supp. at 1183.
85. 532 F. Supp. at 1183.
86. Id at 1183-84. The fifth amendment to the Constitution provides, in part, that no person
shall "be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law. ... U.S. CONST.
amend. V.
87. 532 F. Supp. at 1183.
88. Id
89. Id See Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164, 179-80 (1979); Devines v. Maier, 665
F.2d 138 (7th Cir. 1981). See generally E. DUMBAULD, supra note 29, at 98-103.
90. 532 F. Supp. at 1183.
91. See Fesjian v. Jefferson, 399 A.2d 861, 865-66 (D.C. App. 1979) (statute rendering new
handguns and new machine guns unregistrable held not to be a taking requiring compensation,
but a proper exercise of the police power to prevent a perceived public harm).
92. See Morton Grove, Ill., Ordinance 81-11, § 2(G)(1) (June 8, 1981).
93. 532 F. Supp. at 1184; Morton Grove, Ill., Ordinance 81-li, § 2(E)(7) (June 8, 1981).
94. 532 F. Supp. at 1184; Morton Grove, Ill., Ordinance 81-11, § 2(E)(6) (June 8, 1981).
95. 532 F. Supp. at 1184.
96. Morton Grove, Ill., Ordinance 81-11, § 2(A)(5) (June 8, 1981).
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shotguns and rifles.97 As the district court noted, however, the
Supreme Court had already defined the criteria for determining consti-
tutional vagueness.98 In cases not involving the first amendment,
courts have determined whether a statute is unconstitutionally vague
by examining the facts of the case.99 The Morton Grove court noted
that Mr. Quilici failed to allege that the definition of handgun in the
ordinance is vague with regard to any weapon he possesses. On the
contrary, Mr. Quilici alleged in his complaint that he owns hand-
guns. t°° The inescapable conclusion is that the handgun definition in
the ordinance provided Mr. Quilici with clear notice that such posses-
sion would be illegal.'
III. ILLINOIS CONSTITUTIONAL ISSUES
In 1970, the Illinois Constitution included a right to bear arms provi-
sion for the first time in the state's history.' Article I, section 22 ap-
peared to have established two competing notions. On the one hand,
the provision granted citizens the right to keep and bear arms; on the
other, this right was subject to curtailment by an exercise of the police
power.103 The plaintiffs in Morton Grove argued that Ordinance No.
81-11 impermissibly infringes on the right to keep and bear arms. The
Village contended that the ordinance is a valid exercise of its police
power. ' 4
After an extensive examination of the constitutional history of sec-
tion 22, and in particular the debates among the members of the consti-
97. 532 F. Supp. at 1184.
98. Id See Winters v. New York, 333 U.S. 507, 515 (1948).
99. See United States v. Mazurie, 419 U.S. 544, 550 (1975); United States v. McCauley, 601
F.2d 336, 340 (8th Cir. 1979); United States v. Howard, 569 F.2d 1331 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 439
U.S. 834 (1978).
100. See 532 F. Supp. at 1184.
101. Id See United States v. Powell, 423 U.S. 87, 93 (1975); United States v. National Dairy
Corp., 372 U.S. 29, 32-33 (1963); United States v. Harris, 347 U.S. 612, 617 (1954).
102. See 532 F. Supp. at 1171-72. Article I, section 22 of the Illinois Constitution provides,
"[slubject only to the police power, the right of the individual citizen to keep and bear arms shall
not be infringed." ILL. CONST. art. 1, § 22.
The district court in Morton Grove noted that the draftsmen purposely deleted the words "of the
State" from the clause "[s]ubject to the police power" in order to allow local governments to
exercise their police power as Morton Grove did. In any event, Morton Grove's ability as a local
government to exercise that power has not been challenged in this case. 532 F. Supp. at 1172.
103. See 532 F. Supp. at 1171.
104. See Brief for Defendant at 22-37.
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tutional convention,' the Morton Grove court concluded that the right
to bear arms in Illinois could be limited by banning handguns as an
exercise of the police power.10 6 The court then addressed the question
of whether the enactment of the Morton Grove ordinance was a proper
exercise of its police power. 0 7 The Village of Morton Grove ban on the
possession of handguns by private citizens surpasses the restrictions im-
posed by any other state or municipal firearm regulation in the coun-
try.'0 8 Consequently, the district court in Morton Grove carefully
examined the permissible limits of the police power. The court relied
on City of Carbondale v. Brewster, °9 a recent Illinois Supreme Court
case, for guidelines in determining what constitutes a valid exercise of
the police power."10 According to Brewster, Morton Grove's ordinance
is a valid exercise of the Village's police power so long as the ordinance
bears a reasonable relationship to the protection of public health,
safety, morals, and general welfare or convenience. The district court
concluded that the Village trustees, having the power to attempt to con-
trol crime and prevent handgun related accidents,"' intended to
achieve those goals by enacting Ordinance No. 81-11.'12
105. 532 F. Supp. at 1173-74. See 3 RECORDS OF PROCEEDINGS, SIXTH ILLINOIS CONSTITU-
TIONAL CONVENTION 1686, 1688-89, 1692-93, 1704, 1706, 1718 (1970) [hereinafter PROCEEDINGS];
6 PROCEEDINGS 87; 7 PROCEEDINGS 2689.
106. 532 F. Supp. at 1176. The court concluded that the delegates to the 1970 constitutional
convention also intended that a law totally banning all firearms would violate article 1, section 22
of the Illinois Constitution. See supra note 105.
107. 532 F. Supp. at 1176.
108. See id
109. 78 11. 2d 111, 398 N.E.2d 829 (1979), appeal dismissed, 446 U.S. 931 (1980).
110. Id at 114. In City ofCarbondale v. arewster, the court stated:
[tihe police power may be exercised to protect the public health, safety, morals, and
general welfare or convenience. To be a valid exercise of police power, the legislation
must bear a reasonable relationship to one of the foregoing interests which is sought to
be protected, and the means adopted must constitute a reasonable method to accomplish
such objective. Although the determination of reasonableness is a matter for the court,
the legislature has broad discretion to determine not only what the interests of the public
welfare require but what measures are necessary to secure such interest. The court will
not disturb a police regulation merely where there is room for a difference of opinion as
to its wisdom, necessity and expediency.
Id at 114-15, 398 N.E.2d at 831. See also People v. Haron, 85 111. 2d 261, 279-80, 422 N.E.2d 627,
635 (1981).
111. See Morton Grove, Ill., Ordinance 81-11, preamble (June 8, 1981).
112. 532 F. Supp. at 1179. See Morton Grove, Ill., Ordinance 81-11, preamble (June 8, 1981).
The district court pointed to a number oflllinois cases in which courts held that firearms control
laws were within the purview of the police power. See Brown v. City of Chicago, 42 I11. 2d 501,
250 N.E.2d 129 (1969) (upheld Chicago firearms registration ordinance); Biffer v. City of Chicago,
278 IN. 562, 116 N.E. 182 (1917) (Chicago ordinance restricting the sale and carrying or wearing of
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The question remained, however, whether the ordinance was a rea-
sonable means of promoting the legitimate interests of public health
and safety."t 3 The court stated that, in making this determination, it
could not consider whether the Morton Grove ordinance is an effective
means of achieving its objectives.' 14 Rather, the proper test is whether
the ordinance is an arbitrary means of achieving the legislative ends."15
The Morton Grove court held that although the ordinance may not be a
panacea, this in itself does not render it arbitrary, and thus invalid."16
The plaintiffs in Morton Grove also claimed that Ordinance No. 81-
I I was an invalid exercise of the police power because it prohibits
rather than merely regulates.' ' The district court, however, dismissed
that contention as a misstatement of current Illinois law,"' and de-
clared that Morton Grove's ordinance is not per se invalid because it
concealable weapons held valid); Rawlings v. Dept. of Law Enforcement, 73 IlL. App. 3d 267, 391
N.E.2d 758 (1979) (part of Illinois statute prohibiting former mental patients from obtaining regis-
tration card necessary to legally own a firearm held a valid exercise of the police power); People v.
Williams, 60 Ill. App. 3d 726, 377 N.E.2d 285 (1978) (Illinois concealed weapon statute held a
valid exercise of State's police power).
113. See 532 F. Supp. at 1177.
114. The district court stated, "it is not the role of the court to test the factual validity of the
findings which support an exercise of the police power. That is a uniquely legislative responsibil-
ity." Id at 1178. See Brown v. City of Chicago, 42 Ill. 2d 501, 507, 250 N.E.2d 129, 132-33 (1969)
(the job of courts is to determine the "validity" of legislation, not its "advisability"). The court in
Morton Grove also noted that it was not within the judiciary's scope to determine whether the
means chosen by the Village to ameliorate its perceived problems are the best, or whether more
efficient alternatives exist. 532 F. Supp. at 1177.
115. 532 F. Supp. at 1178. See supra note 110.
116. 532 F. Supp. at 1178. The court stated: "If the present ordinance was adopted on the
expectation . . . that it would serve to inch the Morton Grove community one step further to
becoming peaceful and safe, this would justify the use of the police power. Many social experi-
ments have only small beginnings." Id
The effectiveness of firearms regulation in controlling crime is the subject of considerable de-
bate. See supra notes 4 & 8 and accompanying text. See generally Note, The Impact of State
Constitutional Right to Bear Arms Pro visions on State Gun Control Legislation, supra note 21. The
district court noted, however, that a ban on the possession of handguns in the home may in reality
be the only method of reducing tragic home accidents involving handguns. 532 F. Supp. at 1178.
See supra note 15 and accompanying text.
117. 532 F. Supp. at 1179.
118. Id See People v. Warren, 11 Ill. 2d 420, 424-25, 143 N.E.2d 28, 31-32 (1957), in which
the court stated: "In the exercise of its inherent police power the legislature may enact laws
regulating, restraining or prohibiting anything harmful to the welfare of the people, even though
such regulation, restraint or prohibition interferes with the liberty or property of an individual."
Id Accord Drysdale v. Prudden, 195 N.C. 722, 734, 143 S.E. 530, 536 (1928). See also Biffer v.
City of Chicago, 278 Ill. 562, 116 N.E. 182 (1917); Illinois Liquor Control Comm'n v. City of
Calumet City, 28 Ill. App. 3d 279, 328 N.E.2d 153 (1975).
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prohibits the possession of handguns rather than regulates their use.19
In short, the district court concluded that Ordinance No. 81-11 re-
flected a proper and valid exercise of the police power; its drafters
designed the Ordinance to protect the public health and safety. The
court found that the ordinance does not ban the possession of all fire-
arms, and is neither unreasonable, arbitrary, nor simplistic. Conse-
quently, it did not deprive the plaintiffs of their rights under the Illinois
Constitution. 120
IV. ANALYSIS AND CONCLUSION
The district court in Morton Grove concluded that the difficult polit-
ical questions underlying the enactment of Ordinance No. 81-11 must
ultimately be resolved by the citizens of Morton Grove.' 2 ' The case,
however, raised the issue of whether the power to regulate the posses-
sion of handguns should be in the hands of local legislators. If the
Supreme Court considers the Morton Grove decision, it must decide
whether legislatures can constitutionally ban the possession of hand-
guns under the second amendment. According to precedent, 122 how-
ever, state and municipal governments have always been free to enact
firearms control legislation consistent with their own constitutions.
Congress never intended the enactment of the second amendment to
restrict state action. 1
23
Even if the Court overturns its decision in Presser12 4 and holds the
second amendment applicable to the states,' 25 the individual-collective
right controversy concerning the substantive meaning of the second
amendment remains. The only judicially recognized purpose behind
119. 532 F. Supp. at 1179.
120. Id
121. Id at 1184-85.
122. See supra notes 52-56 and accompanying text.
123. See supra notes 21-34 & 52-56 and accompanying text. The historical purpose of the
second amendment was to prevent the federal government from disarming the various state
militia.
124. See supra notes 17-18 and accompanying text.
125. See Rohner, supra note 16, at 66-70. Rohner suggested that, under the test enumerated in
Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 328 (1937), for whether a particular right granted in the Bill of
Rights should apply to the states, it is very possible that the second amendment will eventually be
incorporated into the fourteenth. Rohner, supra note 16, at 67 n.72. The test stated by Justice
Cardozo in Palko was whether "it violate[s] those fundamental principles of liberty and justice
which lie at the base of our civil and political institutions" for the right not to apply to the states.
302 U.S. at 328 (quoting Herbert v. Louisiana, 272 U.S. 312, 316 (1926)).
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the second amendment is protection of the arguably obsolete 26 collec-
tive right to maintain a well-regulated state militia.'27 If the Supreme
Court finds that an individual right to keep and bear arms is not pro-
tected by the second amendment, then an emboldened Congress could
conceivably and constitutionally enact a nationwide ban on the posses-
sion of handguns. 28 The question is whether this solution is more de-
sirable than allowing each community to evaluate its own particular
needs and legislate accordingly.
Some commentators argue that certain segments of society have a
greater need than others for the supposed protection a handgun affords.
The question arises, for example, whether it would be morally justifi-
able to deprive the dwellers of crime-ridden areas of our nation's cit-
ies-areas in which the police are either unable or unwilling to provide
adequate protection to the citizens of the community--of an arguably
viable means of self-protection, the handgun. 29 The argument against
a nationwide ban on handgun possession on this basis is troublesome,
126. "Irrespective of the Constitutional framers' fear of a national standing army, the United
States currently has one and relies upon it, not upon armed private citizens, to maintain public
security." 532 F. Supp. at 1181. See Levin, supra note 21, at 163-64; Feller & Gotting, supra note
21, at 69. See also Andrews v. State, 50 Tenn. (3 Heisk.) 165, 184 (1871). The Andrews court
stated:
We may for a moment, pause to reflect on the fact, that what was once deemed a stable
and essential bulwark of freedom, "a well regulated militia," though the clause still re-
mains in our Constitutions, both State and Federal, has, as an organization, passed away
in almost every State of the Union, and only remains to us as a memory of the past,
probably never to be revived.
Id
127. See supra notes 38-44 and accompanying text.
128. Seesupra Weatherup, note 16, at 1001. Weatherup noted that the second amendment has
the same meaning today as it did at the time of its adoption, i.e., Congress can regulate the na-
tional guard, but not disarm it against the will of the state legislatures. Id Weatherup also noted,
however, that "there is nothing to stop an outright congressional ban on private ownership of all
handguns and all rifles." Id See supra note 15. Cf. Levin, supra note 21, at 166-67 (suggesting
that in today's society, a right to bear arms is "anachronistic, . . . futile, meaningless and danger-
ous").
Rohner suggests an approach to delineating the nature of the rights granted under the second
amendment. A proper analysis should examine the purposes for which firearms can conceivably
be used. Rohner, supra note 16, at 78-79. Rohner suggests that sporting, hunting, or the protec-
tion of one's person or property could be considered protected purposes. He concedes, however,
that such purposes will most likely be determined on the basis of history, in which case protection
under the second amendment will probably not extend beyond military preparedness and self-
defense. This purposes test, Rohner suggests, could be flexibly interpreted to allow courts to rec-
ognize more or fewer purposes as the exigencies of the times demand. Rohner, supra note 16, at
79 n.152.
129. See, e.g., Kates, supra note 8.
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for its fundamental premise is that our society has failed to provide
adequate security for all its citizens.
Yet it is a fact that we live in a violent society. Whether personal
ownership of handguns is the cause of this evil or is merely an under-
standable and rational response to the realities of life is a question to
which there are no clear answers. Indeed, the emotional response of
many Americans to the climate of fear produced by our high crime rate
has been the purchase of a handgun which has contributed to the prob-
lem. Handguns kept in the home are easy prey to burglars and provide
a bountiful source of weapons for the black market in illegal firearms.
Nevertheless, the onslaught of opposition 30 and publicity that has be-
set the Village of Morton Grove is evidence that many Americans do
not want to surrender their handguns and the peace of mind these
weapons provide.
Nevertheless we, as a nation, can no longer afford to indulge our-
selves in behavior reminiscent of the frontier era, our national adoles-
cence. The easy availability of handguns and their undeniable
involvement in overwhelming numbers of violent crimes compel the
conclusion that the proliferation of handguns in American society can-
not be tolerated. Opponents of restrictive firearms legislation often say
that when guns are outlawed, only outlaws will have guns. While this
may be true, if the total supply of handguns available to the public is
diminished by laws forbidding their possession, the inescapable conclu-
sion is that the raw potential for the destruction of human life is
thereby diminished. A ban on handgun possession coupled with very
severe and certain criminal sanctions for their use in the commission of
any crime appears to be the most rational way to legislatively combat
handgun related crime.
As a nation, we must attempt to live without handguns. Ownership
130. Perhaps the most unusual, and certainly the most unexpected, response to Morton
Grove's ordinance banning handguns came from the small, rural, Atlanta suburb of Kennesaw,
Georgia. Proclaiming the Village of Morton Grove their philosophical adversary, the Kennesaw
City Council unanimously adopted an ordinance requiring heads of households to own and main-
tain guns and ammunition. Some residents approved; others feared it would make the town the
laughingstock of the nation.
In any event, the Kennesaw ordinance intentionally provides no method for enforcement and is
intended to be nothing more than a symbolic roar of defiance against those who advocate stricter
firearms legislation. Kennesaw's chief of police called upon the Morton Grove police department
to forward all the guns turned in by residents of Morton Grove to the Kennesaw police depart-
ment for distribution to unarmed citizens. Officials from Morton Grove balked at the suggestion.
N.Y. Times, March 17, 1982, at 18, col. 1. "
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of such weapons can no longer be considered a national birthright, an
incident of citizenship. The Village of Morton Grove has begun the
first phase of an experiment that has piqued the national curiosity and
captured the imagination of legislatures across the country. The enor-
mity of the problem our society faces from handgun related crime re-
quires the type of bold and innovative action that Morton Grove has
taken.
Eric S. Freibrun
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APPENDIX
AN ORDINANCE REGULATING THE POSSESSION OF FIREARMS
AND OTHER DANGEROUS WEAPONS
WHEREAS, it has been determined thaf in order to promote and protect
the health and safety and welfare of the public it is necessary to regulate the
possession of firearms and other dangerous weapons, and
WHEREAS, the Corporate Authorities of the Village of Morton Grove
have found and determined that the easy and convenient availability of cer-
tain types of firearms and weapons have increased the potentiality of firearm
related deaths and injuries; and
WHEREAS, handguns play a major role in the commission of homicide,
aggravated assault, and armed robbery, and accidental injury and death.
NOW, THEREFORE, BE IT ORDAINED BY THE PRESIDENT AND
BOARD OF TRUSTEES OF THE VILLAGE OF MORTON GROVE,
COOK COUNTY, ILLINOIS, AS FOLLOWS:
SECTION 1: The Corporate Authorities do hereby incorporate the forego-
ing WHEREAS clauses into this Ordinance, thereby making the findings as
hereinabove set forth.
SECTION 2: That Chapter 12 of the Code of Ordinances of the Village of
Morton Grove be and is hereby amended by the addition of the following
section:
"Section 132.102. Weapons Control
(A) Definitions:
Firearm: "Firearm" means any device, by whatever name known,
which is designed to expel a projectile or projectiles by the action of an
explosion, expansion of gas or escape of gas; excluding however;
(1) Any pneumatic gun, spring gun or B-B gun which expels a single
globular projectile not exceeding .18 inches in diameter.
(2) Any device used exclusively for the signalling or safety and re-
quired or recommended by the United States Coast Guard or the Inter-
state Commerce Commission.
(3) Any device used exclusively for the firing of stud cartridges, explo-
sive rivets or similar industrial ammunition.
(4) An antique firearm (other than a machine gun) which although
designed as a weapon, the Department of Law Enforcement of the State
of Illinois finds by reason of the date of its manufacture, value, design and
other characteristics is primarily a collector's item and is not likely to be
used as a weapon.
(5) Model rockets designed to propel a model vehicle in a vertical
direction.
[Vol. 60:1087
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol60/iss3/5
BANNING HANDGUNS
Handgun: Any firearm which (a) is designed or redesigned or made or
remade, or intended to be fired while held in one hand or (b) having a
barrel of less than 10 inches in length or (c) a firearm of a size which may
be concealed upon the person.
Person: Any individual, corporation, company, association, firm, part-
nership, club, society or joint stock company.
Handgun dealer: Any person engaged in the business of (a) selling or
renting handguns at wholesale or retail (b) manufacturers of handguns
(c) repairing handguns or making or fitting special barrels or trigger
mechanisms to handguns.
Licensed Firearm Collector: Any person licensed as a collector by the
Secretary of the Treasury of the United States under and by virtue of
Title 18, United States Code, Section 923.
Licensed Gun Club: A club or organization, organized for the purpose
of practicing shooting at targets, licensed by the Village of Morton Grove
under Section 90.20 of the Code of Ordinance of the Village of Morton
Grove.
(B) Possession:
No person shall possess, in the Village of Morton Grove the following:
(1) Any bludgeon, black-jack, slug shot, sand club, sand bag, metal
knuckles or any knife, commonly referred to as a switchblade knife,
which has a blade that opens automatically by hand pressure applied to a
button, spring, or other device in the handle of the knife; or
(2) Any weapon from which 8 or more shots or bullets may be dis-
charged by a single function of the firing device, any shotgun having one
or more barrels less than 18 inches in length, sometimes called a sawed off
shotgun or any weapon made from a shotgun, whether by alteration,
modification or otherwise, if such weapon, as modified or altered has an
overall length of less than 26 inches, or a barrel length of less than 18
inches or any bomb, bombshell, grenade, bottle or other container con-
taining an explosive substance of over one-quarter ounce for like pur-
poses, such as, but not limited to black powder bombs and Molotov
cocktails or artillery projectiles; or
(3) Any handgun, unless the same has been rendered permanently
inoperative.
(C) Subsection B(l) shall not apply to or affect any peace officer.
(D) Subsection B(2) shall not apply to or affect the following:
(1) Peace officers;
(2) Wardens, superintendents and keepers of prisons, penitentiaries,
jails and other institutions for the detention of persons accused or con-
victed of an offense;
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(3) Members of the Armed Services or Reserve Forces of the United
States or the Illinois National Guard, while in the performance of their
official duties; and
(4) Transportation of machine guns to those persons authorized under
Subparagraphs (1) and (2) of this subsection to possess machine guns, if
the machine guns are broken down in a non-functioning state or not im-
mediately accessible.
(E) Subsection B(3) does not apply to or affect the following:
(1) Peace officers or any person summoned by any peace officer to
assist in making arrests or preserving the peace while he is actually en-
gaged in assisting such officer and if such handgun was provided by the
peace officer;
(2) Wardens, superintendents and keepers of prisons, penitentiaries,
jails and other institutions for the detention of persons accused or con-
victed of an offense;
(3) Members of the Armed Services or Reserve Forces of the United
States or the Illinois National Guard or the Reserve Officers Training
Corp while in the performance of their official duties.
(4) Special Agents employed by a railroad or a public utility to per-
form police functions; guards of armored car companies; watchmen and
security guards actually and regularly employed in the commercial or in-
dustrial operation for the protection of persons employed and private
property related to such commercial or industrial operation;
(5) Agents and investigators of the Illinois Legislative Investigating
Commission authorized by the commission to carry such weapons;
(6) Licensed gun collectors;
(7) Licensed gun clubs provided the gun club has premises from
which it operates and maintains possession and control of handguns used
by its members, and has procedures and facilities for keeping such hand-
guns in a safe place, under the control of the club's chief officer, at all
times when they are not being used for target shooting or other recrea-
tional purposes at the premises of the gun club and gun club members,
while such members are using their handguns at the gun club premises;
(8) A possession of an antique firearm;
(9) Transportation of handguns to those persons authorized under
Subparagraph 1 through 8 of this subsection to possess handguns, if the
handguns are broken down in a non-functioning state or not immediately
accessible.
(10) Transportation of handguns by persons from a licensed gun club
to another licensed gun club or transportation from a licensed gun club to
a gun club outside the limits of Morton Grove; provided however that the
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transportation is for the purpose of engaging in competitive target shoot-
ing or for the purpose of permanently keeping said handgun at such new
gun club; and provided further that at all times during a transportation
said handgun shall have trigger locks securely fastened to the handle.
(F) Penalty:
(1) Any person violating Section B(1) or B(2) of this Ordinance shall
be fined not less than $100.00 nor more than $500.00 or incarcerated for
up to six months for each such offense.
(2) Any person violating Section B(3) of this Ordinance shall be guilty
of a petty offense and shall be fined no less than $50.00 nor more than
$500.00 for such offense. Any person violating Section B(3) of this Ordi-
nance more than one time shall be guilty of a misdemeanor and shall be
fined no less than $100.00 nor more than $500.00 or incarcerated for up to
six months for each such offense.
(3) Upon conviction of a violation of Section B(l) through B(3) of this
Ordinance any weapon seized shall be confiscated by the trial court and
when no longer needed for evidentiary purposes, the court may transfer
such weapon to the Morton Grove Police Dept. who shall destroy them.
(G) Voluntary Delivery to Police
(1) If a person voluntarily and peaceably delivers and abandons to
the Morton Grove Police Department any weapon mentioned in Sections
B(l) through B(3), such delivery shall preclude the arrest and prosecution
of such person on a charge of violating any provision of this Ordinance
with respect to the weapon voluntarily delivered. Delivery under this sec-
tion may be made at the headquarters of the police department or by
summoning a police officer to the person's residence or place of business.
Every weapon to be delivered or abandoned to the police department
under this paragraph shall be unloaded and securely wrapped in a pack-
age and in the case of delivery to the police headquarters, the package
shall be carried in open view. No person who delivers and abandons a
weapon under this section shall be required to furnish ideiftification, pho-
tographs or fingerprints. No amount of money shall be paid for any
weapon delivered or abandoned under this paragraph.
(2) Whenever any weapon is surrendered under this section, the po-
lice department shall inquire of all law enforcement agencies whether
such weapon is needed as evidence and if the same is not needed as evi-
dence, it shall be destroyed.
(H) All weapons ordered confiscated by the court under the provi-
sion of Section F(3) and all weapons received by the Morton Grove Police
Department under and by virtue of Section G shall be held and identified
as to owner, where possible, by the Morton Grove Police Department for
a period of five years prior to their being destroyed.
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(I) Construction:
Nothing in this Ordinance shall be construed or applied to necessarily
require or excuse non-compliance with any provision of the laws of the
State of Illinois or to the laws of the United States. This Ordinance and
the penalties proscribed for violation hereof, shall not supersede, but shall
supplement all statutes of the State of Illinois or of the United States in
which similar conduct may be prohibited or regulated.
(J) Severability:
If any provisions of this Ordinance or the application thereof to any
person or circumstance is held invalid, the remainder of this Ordinance
and the applicability of such provision to other persons not similarly situ-
ated or to other circumstances shall not be affected thereby.
(K) The provisions of this Ordinance shall take effect ninety (90)
days from and after its passage, approval and application in pamphlet
form according to law."
Section 3: That this Ordinance shall be published in pamphlet form. Said
pamphlet shall be received as evidence of the passage and legal publication of
this Ordinance.
[Vol. 60:1087
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol60/iss3/5
